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Prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the dominant theoretical framework
applied to financial markets was the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH). l
Under the ECMH, financial markets function efficiently, with all available information
incorporated into prices and with market prices resulting in an efficient allocation of fi-
nancial resources in an economy.2 As the dominant theoretical framework, the ECMH
also provided the primary justification for regulation, including in the context of Hong
Kong, with regulation based on the concept of market failures.3 Under this framework,
regulation should be used to correct market failures in order to support the efficient oper-
ation of financial markets. Market failures in turn result from the assumptions underlying
the ECMH, namely: (1) rational market participants; (2) perfect information; (3) compet-
itive markets; and (4) absence of transaction costs. Before the global financial crisis, regu-
lation focused on alleviating market failures, especially in relation to information,
competition, and transaction costs. 4 In addition, research increasingly questioned the ra-
tionality assumption; 5 however, prior to the crisis, regulation generally operated on the
basis of the assumption of rationality. Beyond these objectives, regulation was also meant
to address externalities, such as systemic risk.6 While it was arguable that together, regu-
lation based on market failures and externalities would also support confidence-the es-
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sential feature of efficient financial markets-in most cases, including in Hong Kong,
regulation largely focused on information, transaction costs, and to a more limited extent,
externalities.
As a result of the global financial crisis, this fundamental framework for understanding
both financial markets and their regulation has come into serious question. Not only is it
clear that information is not perfect, transaction costs are often high, and competition
imperfect, but also that market participants are not necessarily rational, with confidence
ebbing and flowing in waves. In addition, externalities such as systemic risk can have
significant spillover effects into the real economy, bringing doubt to the assumption that
financial markets support economic growth and that financial innovation and profit-seek-
ing behavior are necessarily beneficial. Instead, while financial markets do provide a pub-
lic good in supporting economic growth, there exists a corollary public good in financial
stability-the avoidance of financial crises.
In Hong Kong, these issues are illustrated in the context of minibonds. Minibonds are
not typical bonds as generally understood. Rather, they are structured financial products
consisting of high-risk complex derivatives including credit default swap (CDS) contracts
guaranteed by Lehman Brothers as the counterparty. 7 As such, these products are in-
tended for institutional or sophisticated investors. Although banking institutions in the
United States have not sold such products to retail investors due to disclosure and liability
considerations under U.S. securities law, there is no comparable disincentive to retail sales
in Hong Kong and Singapore. In other jurisdictions, such as Norway, sales of structured
financial products to retail investors are effectively prohibited on the basis that such inves-
tors often fail to understand the risks involved. 8
In Hong Kong, more than 40,000 investors bought the above Lehman-related invest-
ment products through licensed banks amounting to US$2.6 billion, with US$1.6 billion
of these products in the form of minibonds.9 The collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008, as the counterparty of the guarantee, cast serious doubts about the value of
these products. Critics argued that the selling of these products by banks to retail inves-
tors was not on a level playing field because banks had their individual profile and their
staffs had to meet sales quotas. They also complained that the financial regulators failed
to assess the risks of these products.10 In November 2008, the Hong Kong Legislative
Council invoked the Power and Privilege Ordinance to investigate the "minibonds
crisis." 1
7. SiCURITIES & FUTURES COVMI1SSION, ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEHAsANS MIN'sBONIS CRIsis 33
(2008), http://w .sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/genera/general /ehman/Review%2OReport/Review%20Report.pdf.
8. Press Release, The Financial Supervisory Authority. of Norway., Kredittilsynet Tightens Up on Struc-
tured Products (Feb. 12, 2008), available at http://www.kredittilsynet.no/en/Secondary-menu/Documents/
Press-releases/Kredittilsynet-tightens-up-on-structured-products; Wojciech Moskwa, Nor'way to Tighten Rules
on Structured Products, REUTERS, Feb. 11, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL1 170675820080211.
9. HONG KONG MONETARY AUTHORrrY., REPORT OF TI E HONG KONG MONETARY Au 1IHoRrY ON
ISSUES CONCERNING THE DISTRIBUTION OF STRUCTURED PRODuCTs CONNECTED TO LEHMAN GROUP
COMPAmNIs 11-12 (2008); Min Lee, HK Lawmakers Slam HSBC Role in Lehman Bonds Sale, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6546154.
10. HK Banks Offer to Buy Back Lehman Brothers Minibonds, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 23, 2009, available
at http://www.china.org.cn/business/2009-07/23/content_ 18188856.htm.
11. Legislative Council (Powers And Privileges) Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 382, 4, § 9(1). (-.K.).
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The minibonds crisis is as much a regulatory problem as anything else. The fimdamen-
tal issue is simply whether there is a breach of fiduciary duty between bankers and their
customers at common law. This issue is a deep-rooted problem arising from the ethos of
the Hong Kong financial markets. The regulatory issues relating to the minibond crisis
include: (1) the capital adequacy of the counterparty; (2) the transparency of financial
products, including the reliability of credit rating agencies (CRAs); and (3) the ethos of the
financial markets. All of these issues are interwoven. The lack of capital adequacy and
transparency are colonial legacies inherited by the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (Hong Kong Government) from the previous British colonial reg-
ulatory system. Although the reliability of the CRAs is part of the minibond crisis, this
article does not attempt to address this issue because it considers such as part of the wider
ethos of the financial markets.
Under the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Basic Law),
part of the Laws of the People's Republic of China, the Hong Kong Government is man-
dated to provide "an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of
the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre." 12 This is a de jure ideal. In
reality, the ethos of the financial markets determines the successful operation of this pro-
vision. This article first addresses the issues of fairness and how they affect the banker-
customer relationship. Lack of fairness hinders law reform in improving the financial
markets. Then, it discusses the role of government in financial regulation. Hong Kong
has never seriously subscribed to a forward-looking regulatory system because the society
is dominated by financial elites. Finally, it analyzes the problems in Hong Kong's finan-
cial architecture. This article argues that the minibond crisis is a natural consequence of
these factors.
I. Fairness in Hong Kong's Financial Markets
The issue of fairness is important in understanding whether or not there is any unfair
bargaining power, which gives rise to the presumption of imposing a fiduciary duty on the
bankers in dealing with their customers. From the outset, the financial markets are not
evenly balanced in terms of fairness. If all things are equal, financial professionals and
intermediaries possess an advantage in information resources. A large number of investors
know little about the details of investment products. Further, it is doubtful whether inves-
tors will read financial information such as prospectuses even when they are written in
plain language. 13 Most investors in Hong Kong do not analyze the markets before mak-
ing their investment decisions, but rather run with the crowd. Some may analyze the
markets, but their approach is technical rather than fundamental or portfolio-based.
Surveys have consistently shown that two thirds of investors in Hong Kong consider their
knowledge and skill in investment insufficient. They are informationally-impaired, be-
12. TIIE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA art. 109.
13. See Press Release, Hong Kong Securities & Futures Commission & the Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong, Joint Announcement on the Use of Plain Language in Prospectuses and Application Forms (Mar. 23,
1998), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServletdocno=8PR2 5 (requiring pro-
spectuses to be written in plain language).
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cause either they do not have the necessary information or, if they do, they lack the skill to
analyze the information.
The volatility of the financial markets is a concern that cannot be ignored. The contro-
versies surrounding the implementation of minimum share price illustrates unfair prac-
tices in the financial markets. In this episode, Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing, the
holding company of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Future Ex-
change, (HKEx) released a Consultation Paper on Proposed Amendments to the Listing
Rules Relating to Initial Listing and Continuing Listing Eligibility and Cancellation of
Listing Procedures in July 2002, proposing the adoption of a minimum share price re-
quirement of HK$0.50 (or less than US$0.065).14 This proposal led to a mass sell-off of
these so-called "penny stocks" and the plan was put on the backburner.' 5 It is obvious that
those who invest at this price level are generally gamblers, although a small number of
blue chip stocks trade at nearly these price levels. If the playing field is level, the regula-
tory framework should protect participants who have uninformed behavioral impulses
from the outset. This is not the case in Hong Kong, where gambling has always been a
way of life, 16 and the financial markets facilitate this predilection.
A. THE GAMING NATURE OF FINANcIAL MARKETS
On a theoretical basis, economists may claim that the ECMH is the driving force be-
hind the financial markets. It assumes that traders in the financial markets make rational
use of all available information. Therefore, any errors about future price movements will
offset one another and contribute to the restoration of appropriate equilibrium prices. On
the practical side, rational decisions are not always made, as some financial market partici-
pants, for a range of reasons including ingrained gaming behaviors.' 7 It has been observed
that financial markets are casinos for those players who wish to be respected.1s Realisti-
cally, the confidence in these intangible financial assets is affected by many uncertain fac-
tors, including the irrational behavior of the market players and their culture and
background. As financial technology advances with the invention of new financial prod-
ucts, e.g., derivatives and hedge funds, the level of uncertainty and speculative potential
increases.
In some contexts, the financial markets in Hong Kong are on the fringe of being a
gaming operation. At the same time, there is a statutory provision prohibiting gambling
save for certain exceptions provided under the Gambling Ordinance.' 9 In addition, at
common law, a contract to commit a crime is void ab initio. Gambling includes gaming,
and gaming means "the playing of or at any game for winnings in money or other prop-
erty whether or not any person playing the game is at risk of losing any money or other
property. 20 "Game" means inter alia "a game of chance [...I [or] a game of chance and
14. HONG KONG EXCHANGE. & CLEARING, LiD., CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE LISTING RULES RELATING To INrIAL LISTING AND CONTINUING LISTING ELIGIBILITY AND
CANCELLATION OF LISTiNG PROCEDURES 83, % 144 (2002).
15. Enoch Yiu, Erchange Backflips on Penny Stocks, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), July 29, 2002.
16. See MICI FL H. BOND, BFYOND T[IE CHINESE FACE: INSIGHTS FROM PSYCHOLOGY 91 (1991).
17. GEORGE P. GILLIGAN, REGULATING THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 83 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Gambling Ordinance, (2006) Cap. 148, 2, § 3(1). (H.K.).
20. Id. at 1, § 2.
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skill combined." 2 1 In order to ensure that a game is not a game of chance, skill must play a
predominant role in the outcome. 22 The question is whether, in the long run, the actions
of the players affect the observed outcome.2 3
As an investor in the financial markets intends to make profits contingent upon a future
event, which nobody can accurately forecast, an argument could be made that all securities
and futures contracts are void by reason of their illegality under the Gambling Ordi-
nance.
24 It is immaterial whether the broker is "at risk of losing any money or other
property. ' 25 The only question is whether investing in the securities and futures markets
is a "game of chance and skill combined." 26 A possibility of chance may not suffice; there
should be a high probability of chance. Regardless, no attempt is made to put forward a
case as to whether the securities and futures markets in Hong Kong are illegal. Instead,
the risks and uncertainties in these markets are examined as to whether or not they are on
the fringe of being "a game of chance and skill combined."27
The crucial test is whether the nature of the game is a game of chance. Naturally,
investing in a particular company can hardly be said to be a game of chance, as the rise and
fall of the price of its shares depends on the viability of the business concern, and the
element of chance is negligible (at least in theory). Nonetheless, the nature of the game
can still be a game of chance if skill is out of the consideration. The Taiwan Stock Ex-
change in the early 1990s is a case in point. At the time, half of its trade counters were not
listed, published financial statements were limited, a large volume of trading went unre-
corded, and counterfeit scrip abounded.2 8
One measurement of the degree of chance present in any particular financial market is
whether the volatility of securities indexes is high in comparison with markets in other
countries. It is difficult, however, to make a case for whether a particular market is a game
of chance or not. The volatility of securities indexes depends on the index construction,
industry structures, and exchange rate behavior. 29 There have been a few attempts to
study whether the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong is a gambling instrument, but none of
these are methodically sound. A 1992 study, however, found that the stock market was
very volatile. 30
As to Hong Kong's financial markets, there is evidence that significant segments are
dominated by speculation and thus might constitute a gambling operation. Financial reg-
ulators and market professionals are very much concerned that this possibility should not
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Herbert Soloman, Jurinmetrics, in RESEARCH PAPERS IN STArISTIcS 319, 322-24 (F.N. David
ed., 1966).
23. See WILLEM ALBERT WAGENAAR, PARADOXES OF GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 79 (Lawrence Erlbaum As-
socs. 1988).
24. See Gambling Ordinance, supra note 19, at 2, § 2 (criminalizing "any competition for money or other




28. Lincoln Kaye, Taipei's Dazed Star-gazers, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 8, 1990, at 53.
29. Richard Roll, Industrial Structure and the Comparative Behavior of International Stock Market Indices, 47 J.
FIN. 3, 3-4 (1992).
30. Sheldon Chaosheng Gao, An Analysis of the Hong Kong Stock Market 40 (May 1992) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Cormell University Library).
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arise. Accordingly, the Gambling Ordinance is not applicable to any contract for differ-
ences listed on a stock exchange or traded on any futures exchange, as specified by the
Securities and Futures Ordinance unless the latter ordinance otherwise provides. 31 A con-
tract of difference is defined as "an agreement the purpose or effect of which is to obtain a
profit or avoid a loss by reference to fluctuations in the value or price of property of any
description or in an index or other factor designated for that purpose in the agreement."
32
The Securities and Futures Ordinance expressly excludes the operation of the Gambling
Ordinance to any transaction it regulates unless the Securities and Futures Commission
(SFC) specifically provides otherwise by enacting rules. 33 This exclusion saves the trading
of derivatives, including minibonds, from being classified as illegal gambling.
The majority of investors, however, remain uninformed and base their decisions in
many cases on rumor and chance. A large number of individual investors do not know
anything about the type of investment involved, as demonstrated in the minibond crisis.
As gambling is relying on luck, and skill is virtually absent, the securities market may fulfill
the psychological needs of many people who do not have a long-term interest in mind.
The availability of information in making decisions is essential to minimize the element of
chance in investing in the financial markets. There is nothing of legislative effect that
requires providing information to the investing public. Regulation of the information
flow would minimize the amount of information that is misleading or fraudulent. Ulti-
mately, in a financial market, investors must assume their own risk. A good regulatory
framework not only aims to protect investors by ensuring the fairness of the game, it also
safeguards the financial sector as a whole.
In the context of ensuring financial and management stability of the markets, the ethical
aspects of the game have to be addressed first.
B. THE ETHICAL ISSUES
In Hong Kong, the Securities and Futures Ordinance has the regulatory objectives of
maintaining and promoting the "fairness, efficiency, competitiveness, transparency, and
orderliness of the securities and futures industry." 34 Notwithstanding this, it is obvious
that the financial markets have in many instances circumvented this spirit. The regulatory
framework of the financial markets is not consumer protection legislation in that it im-
poses no implied conditions or warranties on the financial institutions that deal with in-
vestors. The relevant ordinances attempt to ensure that there is fair play in the financial
markets. Naturally, if the game is fair, the risk is lower. One of the risks is that one party
has an unfair advantage over another party or other parties, and benefits from such unfair
advantage. Fairness in the financial markets demands that the players, stakeholders, and
participants should observe ethical standards. The relationship between the financial in-
stitutions and their clients should always be fiduciary in nature, with the financial institu-
tions and professionals expected to operate with utmost good faith in respect of their
clients' (especially retail clients) interests. As such, the regulatory framework of finance
31. Gambling Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 148, § 29, (H.K.); Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap.
251, § 404. (H.K).
32. Gambling Ordinance, supra note 31, at § 2.
33. Securities and Futures Ordinance, spra note 31, at § 404.
34. Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 571, § 4(a).
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should be based on ethical standards. But there is always a vacuum between the law of
finance and the ethical standards expected from financial market participants.
The decisions made by the players in the financial markets have a far-reaching impact
on society as a whole. The management of a financial institution has a duty to maximize
profits for its shareholders, and the manager of a trust fund has a similar duty to maximize
incomes for its beneficiaries. Accordingly, insofar as they operate within the limit of the
laws to achieve these objectives, ethical issues are secondary. In other words, social re-
sponsibility is often ignored. An example is the speculative attack on the Hong Kong
dollar amidst the Asian financial crisis in August 1998. 35 In that situation, speculators
were double-playing on the currency market and the futures market. 36 An attack on the
currency market would force up interest rates, then be followed by profit-taking through
short-selling of the futures index. The aim of these speculative attacks was to make quick
profits in the futures market, 37 despite the risk dia it might result in the meltdown of the
entire financial system. During the crisis, share prices, interest levels, and interest rates
were dictated wholly by manipulators, 38 yet the government was unable to identify the
manipulators, being disguised as they were by many different channels. 39 On August 15,
1998, the Hong Kong Government intervened with a counterattack by deploying its Ex-
change Fund to deal with this very exceptional circumstance. 40
The nature and suddenness of the government's action took many by surprise.4 1 The
intervention drew the wrath of the financial sector, as significant numbers of financial
market professionals were counting on the success of the attack on the Hong Kong cur-
rency as an easy profit-making opportunity. Three years after the intervention, George
Soros, whose Quantum Fund took sizable positions against the Hong Kong currency and
the stock markets in the speculative attack, admitted that the Hong Kong Government did
a very good job when it intervened to prevent the collapse of the capital markets.42 From
the perspective of financial market professionals involved, it was just a legitimate venture
to maximize profits. The calculated consequence to the livelihood of the Hong Kong
people was irrelevant. They even criticized the measures of the Hong Kong Government
as illegal manipulation of the stock market. 43 On the other hand, the Hong Kong Gov-
35. Berry F.C. Hsu, Are Hong Kong's Economic Fundamentals Really Sound? A Call for Reform and Trans-
parency, in FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1990s: A GLOBAL PERSPEcTIVE 344-47 (Douglas Aroer et al. eds.,
2001).
36. Id.; Press Release, Financial Services and the Treasury Bureau, LCQ13: Govt's Move Aims to Frustrate
"Double Play" Strategy (Oct. 14, 1998), http://wxvw.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/press/p981014.htm.
37. Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary, Press Briefing (Aug. 14, 1998), transcript available at http:/I
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199808/14/0814229.htm.
38. See Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary, Remarks at Legislative Council Financial Affairs Panel Meeting
(Sept. 8, 1998), transcript available at htp://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/1 99809/08/0908198.htm.
39. Legislative Council, Financial Affairs Meeting, 28, L.C. Paper No. CB(l) 534/98-99 (Sept. 7, 1998),
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/panels/fa/minutes/faO7O998.htm.
40. Id. at is 13, 23.
41. Erik Guyot et al., Unsure of Government's Market Moves, Hong Kong Investors Platy Guessing Game, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1998, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB903465781745858500.html.
42. Three Years On, Soros Praises Government over Intervention, S. CtonNA MORNING POST (H.K.), Sept. 23,
2001, at N3.
43. Katherine Lynch, The Temptation to Intervene: Problems Created by the Government's Intervention in the
Hong Kong Stock Market, 29 HONG KONG LJ. 123, 134 (2000).
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ernment argued that it was merely maintaining financial stability and leveling the playing
field. 4
The attitude of market professionals, as aforementioned, illustrates the importance of
their professional culture. In this context, culture is defined as "the set of deep-rooted
values, attitudes, and beliefs that affect the way the people in a profession, community, or
firm perceive and behave." 45 Hong Kong is a place where people come to make a fortune,
then leave for more relaxing environs. Most citizens of Hong Kong, whether Chinese or
expatriate, consider wealth to be of the utmost importance.46 Therefore, unethical behav-
ior should be prohibited by legislation rather than by social censure. Prior to the enact-
ment of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, insider dealing offenses resulted only in
civil penalties. Until recently, insider dealing has been more cost-effective than specula-
tive attacks on the Hong Kong currency, as there was no risk to the wrongdoers. None-
theless, there is harm done to others with the inside dealers' unfair advantage over
information. The failure to criminalize this conduct in the past meant that people simply
ignored the legal prohibition if the benefits outweighed the penalties. Apart from insid-
ers, the people who want inside information are financial professionals, listed companies,
and investors. People with vested interests formed an unstable coalition against public
interests by opposing regulatory control over insider dealing.47
Competition is an important ingredient in a free market economic system. There is no
argument that the dominant consideration is to maximize profits. From an economist's
perspective, profit should be maximized through rationality by making the most efficient
use of all available resources. 48 In the competitive world of finance, when a firm earns less
than its competitors, it loses its ability to attract high quality employees. Because human
resources are the most important asset of investment banks, the consequence is that un-
derperforming institutions will be edged out. The measurement of success of a financial
product like minibonds is inevitably the profits it generates; and such is the case even for
ethical funds like environmental funds. Observing ethical standards beyond what is man-
dated is irrelevant and often an obstacle to success when there is a cost attached in doing
so. Therefore, ethical behavior of a firm would be inversely correlated to its income gen-
erated. 49 An ethical dilemma is undoubtedly present. A financial institution that sets high
ethical standards among its employees would have to incur higher expenditures than its
competitors that observe the regulatory minimum. In ensuring that the playing field is
level, the regulatory framework cannot rely upon financial institutions to regulate their
ethical conduct voluntarily without legal sanction.
44. See id. at 130 n.33.
45. ROGER COTIERRELL, LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY: LEGAL IDEAS IN THE MIRROR OF SOCIAL
THEORY 103-104, 155 (2006).
46. Siu-lun Wong, Modernization and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong, 106 CHINA Q. 306, 322-23 (1986).
47. Jake van der Kamp, Case for Abolishing Insider Rules, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Oct. 11, 2000,
Bus. Post, at 14; Jane Moir, Plan to Criminalise Inside Trade Blasted, S. CHINA MORNING POST (B.K), Bus.
Post, Oct. 10, 2000, at 2; Enoch Yiu, Banks Say Bill 'Too Tough' on Disclosure, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(H.K.), May 22, 2001, Bus. Post, at 1.
48. James H. Michelman, Some Ethical Consequences of Economic Competition, 2 J. Bus. ETHICS 79, 82-85
(1983).
49. Id. at 85-86.
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C. THE ELEMENTS OF FAIRNESS
In Hong Kong, the goal of a "level playing field" has become fashionable only in recent
years after decades of financial crises. It started as rhetoric, particularly in statements
made by financial regulatory agencies. 5° Nevertheless, the concept of a level playing field
has never been discussed. It is uncertain what a level playing field is in Hong Kong's
context, as it has different meanings for different people. An understanding of the regula-
tory framework requires common acknowledgment of a level playing field from the per-
ceptions of the regulators and stakeholders of the financial markets. Historically, financial
elites in Hong Kong devised the rules respecting the level playing field to support their
interests with the blessing of the law. In any event, this does not mean that there is not a
shared value of the level playing field. It has been suggested that the perimeter of the levelplaying field can be defined by the four basic elements of fairness. 51 A understanding of
the Hong Kong financial markets is demonstrated by analyzing these four basic elements.
The first element is that all players must start equally. 52 This is not the case in Hong
Kong, where deeply rooted interests tend to dominate. For example, the Association of
Banks was incorporated by the Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance. 53 All li-
censed banks are statutory members of the Association. 54 The three leading banks5 5 are
statutory members of the powerful Committee of the Association.5 6 This ordinance em-
powers the Association "from time to time to make such rules relating to the conduct of
the business of banking after consultation with the Financial Secretary," and the Associa-
tion is empowered to discipline members who violate any rule relating to the conduct of
the business of banking.5 7 Therefore, what is conceived of as a level playing field may not
necessarily be followed in other jurisdictions or cultures.
The second element of fairness is that the outcome is what matters. 58 Accordingly, if
the market participants are disadvantaged, fairness requires there should be no restriction
for competition.5 9 The goal of regulatory competition among different regulatory agen-
cies should encourage innovation and result in the implementation of the most efficient
regulatory framework. 60 Prior to the enactment of the Securities and Futures Ordinance,
an exempted person (e.g., a bank) was not required to register as a securities dealer or
adviser. 61 An applicant for exemption as a dealer, the SFC had to be satisfied that securi-
ties were part of the dealer's business and that the ongoing business was unlikely to pose
50. For example, an internet search of the Securities and Futures Commission's website has shown that this
phase has been used extensively since 2001, and has appeared in no less than 157 speeches, press releases, etc.
See http://www.hksfc.org.hk/htmVEN/ (follow "Search" hyperlink; then enter "level playing field" as
keywords for search).
51. HELEN A. GARiEN, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THIE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 7 (2001).
52. Id. at 7-10.
53. Hong Kong Association of Banks Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 364, 3, § 1. (H.K.).
54. Id. § 7(1).
55. These banks are the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), the Standard Chartered
Bank, and the Bank of China.
56. Banks Ordinance, svpra note 53, at § 8(l)(a).
57. Id. §§ 12(1), 17(1).
58. Garten, stvpra note 51, at 10-11.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Securities Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 333, 47, § 1. (H.K.) (repealed 2002).
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an undue risk to the investors.62 This requirement gave special consideration to banking
institutions that provided investment advice to their clients. The SFC could also exempt
banking institutions or persons who only advised financial institutions or overseas clients
from the licensing requirements. 63 Further, it could declare any licensed bank or trustee
company an exempt dealer without any consideration.64 The grant of exempt dealers and
exempt investment advisors to banking institutions was an abdication of power by the
SFC, as the assumption was that they fell under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Mone-
tary Authority (HKMA). This abdication acted against the principle of regulatory compe-
tition. Although the Securities and Futures Bill originally retained such an exemption, it
was eventually replaced in the Securities and Futures Ordinance with a system of dual
regulation, with the HKMA regulating the securities activities of banks, albeit under the
identical rules of the SFO and related subsidiary legislation. The leveling of this playing
field was met with opposition from the banking institutions.65 Under these circumstances,
the conflict between the SFC and HKMA arising from the minibond crisis was natural.
The third element of fairness is that fair play is demanded. 66 Although Hong Kong is a
free market economy, a level playing field requires the protection of market participants
who have lesser bargaining power. Accordingly, the regulatory framework should ensure
such market participants that the financial markets are fair by equalizing the bargaining
power.67 The introduction of the Mandatory Provident Fund means that all employers
and employees must make contributions to the funds administered by financial institu-
tions.68 As the employers do not have a vested interest in the returns of the investment
funds, they are more interested with cost effectiveness, i.e., what each financial institution
offers rather than with the fairness of the trust conditions of each fund. The upshot is that
some financial institutions impose onerous terms in the trust conditions, within the statu-
tory limit, while offering lower costs to the employers. The employees have no bargain-
ing power in the selection of the financial institutions, thus there is a conflict of interest
between the employers and the employees. What the employers perceive as fair is their
ability to choose the financial institutions in an open market. Therefore, the regulatory
framework should protect employees without any bargaining power by removing the on-
erous terms in the trust conditions, and by enhancing the transparency and accountability
of the investment funds as if the employees can choose them with fair bargaining power in
the open market.
The fourth element of fairness is that the market and its winners should pick losers, not
the government.69 Accordingly, the market participants should be free to reap the gains
and bear the losses, and the government should not distort the outcome. 70 The financial
markets in Hong Kong suffer the worst form of moral hazard problem, as demonstrated
by the events in the case of CA Pacific Securities Ltd. in 1998. In that case, the govern-
62. Id. §§ 60, 61.
63. Id. §§ 60(4), 61(1).
64. Id. § 60(4).
65. Enoch Yiu, Bankers and Brokers Do Battle over Two New Bills, S. CHINA MomTNG POST (HONG KONG),
Dec. 8, 2000, Bus. Post, at 2.
66. GARTEN, supra note 51, at 11.
67. Id.
68. Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 485, § 7A. (H.K) (amended 2002).
69. GARTEN, sn/pra note 51, at 11-12.
70. Id.
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ment gave in to the demand of investors and politicians for greater compensation from the
Securities Compensation Fund. 71 Another example is the enactments of the Hang Lung
Bank (Acquisition) Ordinance in 1983, and the Overseas Trust Bank (Acquisition) Ordi-
nance in 1984 which rescued two failing banks with resources from the Exchange Fund
and distorted the money supply. Yet another is the real estate market decline after the
Asian financial crisis in 1997, when the Hong Kong Government took a series of measures
to rescue the real estate markets.72 The ostensible motive was to bailout the banking
institutions from increasing negative equity assets73 and the politically influential real es-
tate developers. These measures distorted the level playing field and have failed to prevail
over the free market economy.
D. UNFAIR BARGAINING IN FINANcIAL MARKETS
The regulatory framework of the financial markets is structured to facilitate financial
transacting rather than to achieve a level playing field. The Securities and Futures Ordi-
nance has harmonized the enforcement aspect by standardizing the rules for all financial
institutions. Regardless of this harmonization, the regulatory structure is scattered across
numerous agencies that regulate the financial institutions according to the activities they
undertake. Accordingly, a banking institution is regulated by at least four regulatory
agencies. 74 Each of these regulatory agencies is vying for resources from the Hong Kong
Government, often on the basis of efforts to achieve a level playing field. An example is
that while Hong Kong claims to be an international financial center, there is no prudential
rule requiring financial institutions to be accountable to beneficiaries of their pension
funds managed by them. The financial institution may be exploiting the indifference of
the employers who select it, the apathy of the relevant regulatory agency, which has its
own agenda, and the lack of knowledge and sophistication of the employees who do not
have the time to fight for their rights. This is not fair play, as financial institutions that
voluntarily choose to be accountable to the beneficiaries of their pension funds incur addi-
tional costs and have to compete with ones who choose the regulatory minimum.
When the playing field is level, competition should safeguard against conflicts of inter-
est and abusive behavior of the financial institutions. 75 This only operates well when the
consumers in financial markets have the bargaining power to choose the financial institu-
tions they wish to deal with, and when they are competent to choose their financial insti-
tutions. In Hong Kong, consumers have limited bargaining power in many contexts, as
the financial institutions are free to collude among themselves for unfair contractual terms
within the regulatory framework in the absence of antitrust legislation. The confidence of
71. Editorial, MING PAo DAILY (HONG KONG), Jan. 24, 1998, at A2; HKFailed Companies' Liquidators Say
No, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at Al.
72. Berry Hsu, Is the Financial Crisis over in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region?: An Evaluation of
the HKSAR's Banking Frame',work, 16 BANKING & FIN. L.R. 275, 285-86 (2001); Press Release, Michael Suen,
Secretary for Housing, Planning, and Lands, Statement Concerning the Government's Housing Policy at the
Legislative Council (Nov. 13, 2002), http://ww.devb-plb.gov.hk/eng/press/2002/20021113244.htil.
73. Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Residential Mortgage Loans in Negative Equity
March Quarter (May 9, 2003), http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/press/category/resident index.htni.
74. These agencies are the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Insurance Authority, Mandatory Provident
Fund Authority, and Securities and Futures Commission.
75. GAR rEN, supra note 51, at 145.
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the public in the financial markets is crucial to economic and political stability. There-
fore, a comprehensive regulatory framework of the financial markets should prevail over
market competition. Unfortunately, the regulatory structure has grown in response to
financial crises. It has never had any long-term planning of its regulatory framework,
despite support for this in the Basic Law.
There is no doubt that there are transaction costs attached to compliance with rules of
fair play.76 These costs are ultimately passed on to the consumers. Not all these rules are
efficient and fair to all market participants. The inefficiency of these rules possibly results
in more competitive inequalities among financial institutions. 77 The upshot is that the
playing field is even more unlevel. Therefore, a balance has to be struck. It should always
be the responsibility of the regulators to review and adjust the rules of fair play in ensuring
that they are efficient and fair to all market participants.
II. Financial Regulation
Regulatory reform in Hong Kong's financial markets has been implemented in the wake
of each successive financial crisis to address market failures. The foregoing discussion has
identified the need for government intervention in correcting the market defects in pro-
viding adequate information, regulating gambling behavior, leveling disparities in bar-
gaining power, and rationalizing the regulatory agencies. In ensuring a level playing field,
the investors must have all the relevant information in order to make their own decisions
and have the necessary skill and knowledge in analyzing them. From an economist's per-
spective, there are transaction costs in providing the information. The gambling nature of
the financial markets suggests a more paternalistic approach of the government in neces-
sary in regulating the behavior of market participants in enhancing the efficiency of the
financial markets so that the dependence upon skill and knowledge in investment deci-
sions is maximized.
Still, there are those who lack bargaining power, and therefore free market forces can-
not operate to allocate resources efficiently. Accordingly, regulations are essential to en-
sure that resources are efficiently allocated, e.g., insider dealing prohibitions and
prospectus requirements. Because there are too many financial regulatory agencies, they
cannot be efficiently operated. At the same time, those regulated would be inundated with
loads of regulatory requirements from different agencies, making it very expensive to
comply.
In this information era, money can come in and out of a jurisdiction in a split second,
and as multi-billion dollar financial transactions. Financial technology advances at such a
speed that regulators cannot realistically grasp the new products in the financial markets
and regulating market misconduct becomes more difficult. With its lucrative compensa-
tion, the financial sector attracts more talented individuals than regulatory agencies. Con-
sequently, the regulatory framework can hardly be perfect. Like other jurisdictions, the
regulatory framework of finance in Hong Kong is a product of various attempts by regula-
tors to address the deficiencies of the financial markets learned from each financial crisis,
after compromising with market participants. The currency board was established in 1983
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id. at 156.
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because of a foreign exchange and banking crisis. The SFC (formerly a government de-
partment) was established in 1989 as a result of the market crash of 1987. The HKMA
(formerly two government departments, one for banking and one for the currency system)
was established in 1993 following the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Inter-
national (BCCI). The demutualization of the stock exchange took place after the Asian
financial crisis of 1997. The Securities and Futures Ordinance was belatedly and reluc-
tantly enacted after this crisis because of the review following the 1987 market crash.
Hong Kong has never implemented a forward-looking review of its regulatory system.
The major participants in the financial market simply do not wish to be regulated.
A sound financial market regulatory framework is vital for the long-term stability of the
capital and money markets of any jurisdiction. It would attract investment and financial
innovation and foster a better business environment. Hong Kong is a major center of
capital and money markets in China and Asia, and its prosperity very much depends on its
continuing importance as a center of trade and finance. It should be able to provide long-
term investment for the rest of China and Asia through its securities markets. It continues
to be a free market economy with as little government intervention as possible. Some
economists argue that market demand is the most efficient means of allocating resources,
but others claim that the absence of regulatory control is contrary to the public interest
and may lead to inefficiency. Needless to say, there are transaction costs attached to any
regulatory framework. There should be a balance between a free market economy and a
regulatory framework. There are many regulatory systems adopted by different jurisdic-
tions. The question is what system should Hong Kong adopt and to what extent should
the financial markets be regulated? Like other common law jurisdictions,7 8 Hong Kong
has developed a number of regulatory agencies, each with its own specific jurisdiction, to
enforce specific financial regulations.
A. THE THEORIES OF REGULATION
Insofar as this article is concerned, no definition of regulation has yet been provided.
Legally speaking, there is no common law or statutory definition of regulation. From a
practical perspective, regulation can be defined as legal control that is enforceable by a
public body. The Hong Kong Government has always prided itself on the Special Admin-
istrative Region being one of the freest economies in the world. 79 Historically, in both the
colonial period and today, the norm for financial markets has been unregulated. As dis-
cussed earlier, the reforms of the financial markets were in response to financial crises.
Any attempt to reform the financial markets has met fierce resistance from the coalition of
financial market participants, politicians, and even members of the Executive Council.
When their interests conflict with public interests, their interests prevail. As an example,
the proposal by the SFC to take over the frontline regulatory role of the HKEx has been
shelved by the government after protests by the financial sector.8 0 Oddly, the plan to
detach frontline securities market regulation from the HKEx was considered a threat to
78. These jurisdictions include Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States.
79. Press Release, Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Minimal Change in Market Freedom (Aug.
22, 2000), http://www.hktdc.com/info/mi/a/ef/en/IXOOQ1OX/l/Economic-Forum/Minimal-Changes-in-
Market-Freedom-Press-Release-.htm.
80. Enoch Yiu, HKEx to Retain Regulatory Role, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.), Apr. 11, 2003.
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China's national interests because companies from mainland China could continue to list
their shares in the less regulated HKEx. 81
The apathy toward the financial markets by members of the legislature has helped to
maintain regulatory weaknesses and inconsistencies. Politicians generally prefer to deal
with issues such as social justice and human rights, rather than complex financial legisla-
tion. The delay of the Legislative Council in enacting the composite Securities and Fu-
tures Ordinance supports this claim. There has always been a close relationship between
the government and big business. Senior executives from the financial sector 82 have been
appointed as members of the Executive Council directly or Legislative Council indirectly
as a de facto right.83 The Basic Law makes provisions for functional constituencies, which
assures representatives from the banking and financial, insurance, real estate, commercial,
and industrial sectors their respective seats in the Legislative Council.84 The civil servants
who monitor banking and financial institutions report to these Councils. Banks and big
corporations that borrow from them are often related. Corporate cross-shareholding is
not uncommon because a number of smaller banks have always been family-owned.
Under this circumstance, the regulatory framework of finance is a result of compromise
among its influential economic, political, and social elites.
The capture theory states that regulators are not concerned with public interest, but
rather collude with interest groups who control the regulators in maximizing their own
wealth.85 It holds that the regulatory framework is the product of interest groups strug-
gling among themselves to maximize their respective interests.8 6 This theory explains the
regulatory framework of the financial market, where the coalition of powerful business
and financial interests is highly influential in the context of financial regulation. They
were not only successful in delaying the enactment of the Securities and Futures Ordi-
nance, they were also instrumental in shelving the proposal of the SFC to take over the
frontline regulatory role over the HKEx. The regulatory process in Hong Kong is more
likely an outcome of negotiation between of the coalition of interested elites. When the
regulations promote the interest of the investors, it is likely a result of public pressure
arising from financial crisis. This draws a complimentary theory, the public interest the-
ory, which states that regulation is an outcome of public demand in addressing inefficient
or inequitable market practices. 8 7
The public interest theory, which considers regulation a natural regulatory response to
market failure, is applicable to Hong Kong; its market failures can always be explained by
the inadequate regulatory framework. The imperfection of the financial markets justifies
government intervention. There is a cost attached to the regulation, however, which is
81. Enoch Yiu, Listings Super Regulator Threatens Cbina's Interests, Says Charles Lee, S. CHINA MORNING
Pos'r (H.K.), Apr. 7, 2003.
82. The Chairman of the Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing House Ltd. is a sitting member of the
powerful Executive Council appointed by the Chief Executive as at 19 May 2003. During colonial era, the
Chairman of Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) had a de facto seat in the powerful
Executive Council.
83. BERRY Hsu, LAWS OF BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE HONG KONG SAR 190 (1998).
84. Legislative Council Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 542, § 20. (H.K.).
85. R. Ho, The Regulatory Framework of the Banking Sector, in THE HONG KONG FINANCIAL SYsTrEA 92 (R.
Ho, R. Scott, & K.A. Wong eds., 1996).
86. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. 335, 335-36 (1974).
87. Id.
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imposed upon the financial market participants. Ultimately, the investing public bears
this transaction costs and the public interest may not be properly served. This makes the
dialectic theory redundant,88 as it holds that the behavior of those regulated is changed by
the regulatory framework as they find means to circumvent regulations. Eventually, the
regulatory framework becomes meaningless. It is the regulation rather than the market
that fails.
B. THE SOcIO-EcONOMICS OF FINANcIAL REGULATION
One of the main reasons why the regulatory framework is inadequate in addressing
misconduct in financial activities is the failure to enforce a strong system of criminal jus-
tice in dealing with financial offenses (or white-collar crimes). Criminologists have sug-
gested that power issues may provide a clue why financial offenses have often been
marginalized. 89 Nevertheless, financial misconduct is more serious than other types of
fraud as not only the investors suffer, but the entire economy may be in crisis as a result.
In Hong Kong, there has been no research into white-collar crimes in the financial
markets. Rather, most of the research is conducted from a black-letter law perspective.
Nevertheless, the regulatory framework of finance emerges from its cultural and political
context. According to a sociological study, a major obstacle to rigorous enforcement of
white-collar crimes in the financial markets is attributed to the moral ambivalence of mar-
ket participants.90 There is evidence that white-collar crimes are more tolerated, and little
stigma, if any, attached (though this may be changing in recent years). The profit-making
objectives of a business are often in conflict with its social responsibilities. 9 1 Accordingly,
a strong regulatory framework is required in ensuring compliance.
C. A FORWARD LOOKING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A fundamental problem is that the financial regulatory system does not treat similar
situations equivalently. The financial markets are far from being a level playing field. A
healthy financial market requires a sound system of legislation, which regulates corporate
governance. Modern company law should have sufficient transparency to instill investor
confidence, minimize transaction costs, maximize efficiency in the running of a company,
and place a reasonable burden on corporate management. This issue also concerns the
management and ownership of banking institutions. The present version of the Compa-
nies Ordinance 92 fails to achieve these objectives. It relies heavily on the 19th century
version of the British Companies Act. The Companies Law Revision Committee, ap-
pointed in 1962, made its two most significant recommendations in 1971 and 1973. 93 The
Companies (Amendment) Ordinance 1984 modeled the present Companies Ordinance
88. Edward J. Kane, Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case Against Selective Credit Allocation, J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, Feb. 1977, at 55-69.
89. Gilligan, supra note 17, at 74-75.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Companies Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 32. (H.K.).
93. Hong Kong Companies Law Revision Commission, FIRST REPOir OF THE COMPANIES LAW REVI-
SION COMLMITTEE: THE PROTECTION OF INVESTORS (1971); Hong Kong Companies Law Revision Com-
mission, CoMPANY LAW: SECOND RFPOR r OF THE COMPANIES LAW REVISION COVNIITrFEE (1973).
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upon the 1948 version of the British Companies Act, which was based on its 1862 version,
in implementing most of the recommendations of the Committee. Between 1973 and
1984, four new versions of the Companies Act were enacted in Great Britain. The provi-
sions of the ordinance as of December 31, 2003 are archaic.
In March 1997, the Consultancy Report on the Review of the Hong Kong Companies
Ordinance 94 was released. It provided a new direction for corporate governance. It ad-
dressed the problems of the present requirements for financial disclosure 95 and standard of
care for directors,96 as well as the conflicts of interest in corporate governance. 97 It also
set out new incorporation procedures98 and a simplified share structure, 99 which would
substantially reduce transaction costs. It recommended the adoption of generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) that are to be set by an independent accounting standards
body.1°° In February 1998, the International Monetary Fund suggested to the Hong
Kong Government that it should broaden the disclosure requirements further to help
reduce market uncertainty and limit the risk of unwarranted contagion.01 But any at-
tempt to revamp the company law in Hong Kong has historically been met with opposi-
tion from interested groups. The present version of the Companies Ordinance, although
currently being substantially revised, still has room to meet international standards.
Ill. Financial Reform and Globalization
The globalization of financial markets marks the beginning of the integration of the
banking and financial markets of Hong Kong with the rest of China and of China's mar-
kets with global markets. This means that no jurisdiction can have its own unique regula-
tory framework for finance. As a founding member of the World Trade Organization,
Hong Kong has to harmonize its domestic laws and principles with international stan-
dards. As a self-proclaimed international financial center, Hong Kong has learned that it
must reform its financial architecture in line with international standards. Although it
weathered the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and also the current global financial
crisis, its banking and financial institutions face increasing challenges. Reform would in-
volve commitment to enhancing its financial architecture, with special emphasis on corpo-
rate governance and corporate finance. The vehicle to enhance its legal institutions
should accommodate more resilient and diversified domestic banking and financial sys-
tems that would protect the interests of the investing public. Reforming Hong Kong's
financial architecture in line with international standards does not necessarily enhance the
efficient functioning of its banking and financial system. More importantly, its culture,
society, and legal institutions have to support the successful implementation of interna-
tional financial architecture. All these problems are interwoven and interdependent.
94. ERMpANO PAscuvvo & CALLY JORDAN, CONSULTANCY REPORT, REVIEW OF THE HONG KONG
COMPANIES ORDINANCE (1997), available at http://www.cr.gov.hk/en/standing/docs/concmpny.pdf.
95. Id. at 99-105.
96. Id. at 121-23.
97. Id. at 129.
98. Id. at 82.
99. Id. at 88-98.
100. Id. at 100.
101. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Article IV Consultation Discussions held in 1997 with the
P.R.C in Respect of the H.K Special Admin. Region (Feb. 16, 1998).
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Although Hong Kong has adopted the English common law system, and its Basic Law
provides that the common law system shall be maintained until 2047,102 common law is
nevertheless an imported law to most citizens of the SAR. Adopting international finan-
cial architecture without considering the local factors may have adverse effects on its judi-
cial development. Studies have shown that the successful operation of a legal system
largely depends on the legal culture of the jurisdiction.103 The common law first im-
ported to the former Hong Kong in 1841 has undergone its own development, although it
has been deeply influenced by the precedents and legislation of the United Kingdom prior
to July 1, 1997.104 This legal system was not accepted by the people of the HSKAR
through gradual evolution, but rather through adoption by imposition. The simple adop-
tion of international standards into domestic legislation would have to pass two barriers.
The first is that it has to conform and harmonize with the law and legal concepts of Hong
Kong's legal system.1 "' There are only a few international standards that can be readily
understood and applied.1° 6 The second is that law is a cognitive institution. 107 Accord-
ingly, the laws must be accepted and understood by the regulators, the regulated, and the
adjudicators. 108 Hong Kong does not have an effective legal institution to embed interna-
tional standards in banking and finance law because most of its judiciary and members of
the legal profession are black-letter lawyers who are not well versed in economics and
finance.
Reforms in Hong Kong in relation to international financial architecture may distort,
rather than enhance, the regulatory framework unless its legal infrastructure is prepared
for the changes. 109 There is always a concern that developed international standards have
not been put to the test of functionality in individual jurisdictions."l 0 The effect is that lay
members of the investing public may be misled into believing that those international
standards are properly implemented and that they may rely upon them."' Moreover, the
regulatory mechanism has to ensure full compliance with these standards. When conflicts
of interest are the prevailing norm in the political culture, as in Hong Kong, it raises
doubts about the merit of adopting international standards. For example, the adoption of
international accounting standards (International Financial Reporting Standards or IFRS)
is problematic in Hong Kong. Although international accounting standards are followed,
they leave room for exceptions. As a consequence, "creative compliance" prevails. While
Hong Kong is prepared to adopt a particular IFRS provision," 2 it excludes the part that
requires corporations to place annual changes in the valuations of their property holdings
in the profit and loss account instead of the current practice of putting the changes into
102. BASIC LAW, art. 8.
103. See generally BERRY Hsu, THE COMMON LAW: IN CHINESE CONTEXT (1992).
104. See id.





109. Pistor, supra note 105, at 99.
110. Id. at 102.
111. Id. at 103.
112. International Accounting Standards Commission [IASC], LAS 40 Investment Propery, (Apr. 2000).
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balance-sheet reserves."13 The powerful coalition of property developers, who are also
market participants, naturally oppose the IFRS standard, as this would make their profits
more volatile.' 14 After being criticized by the International Monetary Fund, Hong Kong
enacted the Financial Reporting Council Ordinance, which establishes an independent
accounting standards body. 115
The International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) issues the Objec-
tives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Principles). 1 6 As a member of lOSCO, the
SFC subscribes to the modernization of financial legislation in accordance to IOSCO
principles. Before it may do so, it has to ensure that the Hong Kong Government reforms
its legal system to accommodate this reform. Insofar as accounting standards are con-
cerned, Article 4.2.1 of the Principles requires that accounting and auditing standards
should be of a high and internationally acceptable quality. 17 As discussed, this is just not
the corporate culture in Hong Kong. The implementation of the Principles depends very
much on the legal infrastructure of a particular jurisdiction. The corporate ownership and
governance, accounting standards, and bankruptcy law in Hong Kong have room for im-
provement in fulfilling the spirit of Article 2 of the Principles, which states:
There is often no single correct approach to a regulatory issue. Legislation and regu-
latory structures vary between jurisdictions and reflect local market conditions and
historical development. The particular manner in which a jurisdiction implements
the objectives and principles described in this document must have regard to the
entire domestic context, including the relevant legal and commercial framework.118
IV. Financial Architecture in Hong Kong
The efficiency of a financial market, as well as its integrity, is the key to attracting
domestic and overseas investment. In an economy that heavily depends on service indus-
tries, this is crucial to its sustainable economic development. The globalization of finan-
cial markets, the advancement of high technology, and increased competition from other
financial markets require further consideration about the structure of the financial mar-
kets, as well as the quality of its financial intermediaries and their representatives. Regard-
less of how well the regulatory framework of a financial market is constructed, it inevitably
has to rely on the human component to operate. The intermediaries and their representa-
tives are the key players who make profits in the financial market by bringing the investors
and companies that raise funds by listing shares together in a single exchange. This would
minimize the transaction costs in an economy of scale. The intermediaries and their rep-
resentatives include those who make or introduce new products in the financial markets
not only for raising capital from the investors, but also for protecting investors from mar-
113. Enoch Yiu, Accounting Watchdog Rejects Property Valuations Move, S. CHINA MORNING POST (H.K.),
Mar. 14, 2003, at B1.
114. Id.
115. Fin. Reporting Council Ordinance, (2006) Cap. 588. (H.K.).
116. International Organization of Securities Committees [IOSC], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regu-
lation, at 1 (May 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf.
117. Id. art. 4.2.1.
118. Id. art. 2.
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ket risks. They are also a major provider of financial information upon which an efficient
financial market relies. The manner and accuracy in which such information is dissemi-
nated is vital to the overall health of the economy. Therefore, heavy reliance should be
placed upon the integrity of these intermediaries and their representatives. But a conflict-
ing role is seemingly inevitable. The intermediaries act as agents for the investors as well
as the companies that list the shares. The intermediaries and their representatives only
stand to gain from commission rather than the profits, if any, of the selling and buying of
shares from the investors. As there are ample opportunities for them to cut corners and
take the benefits from the investors, an agency problem has to be resolved by legislation as
well as internal control systems of the organization that they operate.
Prior to the 1973 crash, the financial markets in Hong Kong were virtually unregulated.
Anyone could trade and deal in securities, futures, and foreign exchange. Likewise, any
person could call himself or herself a dealer, investment adviser, representative, or use any
title he or she wished. The statutory control aims at screening out the key players in the
financial markets by establishing minimum standards for entrants. These standards en-
sure the investing public that they are dealing with the right people without having to
shop around. As most investors are uninformed, the regulatory body must act for them
because it has the expertise and skill to know and the power to investigate. This can be
achieved by licensing the financial intermediaries as well as the products. Not only does
such a system benefit the investing public, but it also raises the overall standing of the
financial intermediaries and their representatives in the community at large, as well as cut
down their competitors who do not meet the licensing requirements. A sound supervisory
regime and insurance fund can enhance public confidence in the financial markets.
But there are social and private costs attached to a licensing system. As the financial
intermediaries and their representatives are the major winners in such a system, they
should bear the greater portion of the costs. A sound licensing system also promotes
Hong Kong as an international financial center and, hence, benefits the community at
large. The Securities and Futures Ordinance makes provisions for the funding of the
regulatory body, the SFC, from general revenue as well as levies from the major players in
the financial markets. 1 9 It also makes provisions to control the number of exchange com-
panies so that transaction costs can be minimized in collecting levies and regulating the
financial markets.120 In effect, it confers the monopoly right to operate stock and future
markets on the HKEx. The legislative intention is to enable this merged entity to benefit
from the economies of scale, concentration of resources, consistency, and coherence in
business and risk management strategies in meeting global challenges.' 2' These factors
have to weigh against the efficiency of a competitive market.
The Securities and Futures Ordinance specifies that the transactions that may be con-
ducted on the stock exchange are dealings in securities and other financial products as
approved by SFC and that the transactions conducted on the futures market are dealings
in futures contracts and other financial products.' 22 As discussed, the Executive Govern-
ment sets the financial polices and supervises the SFC. The HKEx has also been vested
119. Securities and Futures Ordinance, supra note 34, at §§ 13, 14, 394 (H.K.).
120. Id. § 19(2).
121. Hong Kong Financial Services Bureau, Consultation on the Securities and Futures Bill, at 21, SU B38/2000
(Apr. 2, 2000), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/hcsub_com/sc 11/general/sc 1 l.brf.pdf.
122. Securities and Futures Ordinance, supra note 34, at § 20.
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with limited regulatory powers. These arrangements create a "three-tier" system. The
ordinance empowers the Chief Executive in Council to make a "transfer order," as re-
quested by the SFC so that it may transfer its functions to the H-IKEx. 123 The SFC must
be satisfied that the recognized exchange controller, i.e., the HKEx, is willing and able to
perform these functions.124 Accordingly, under the Securities and Futures (Transfer of
Functions - Stock Exchange Company Order), the SFC's function of vetting prospectuses
relating to listings under the Companies Ordinance 25 and the Securities and Futures
Commission Ordinance is transferred to the HKEx.126 The SFC places significant em-
phasis on the cooperation and participation of the HKEx in the regulatory process. It is
responsible for supervising, monitoring, and regulating the activities of HIKEx. 127 Ac-
cordingly, the SFC and HKEx signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Matters Re-
lating to SFC's Oversight, Supervision of Exchange Participants and Market Surveillance
on February 20, 2001.128
The HKEx is the frontline regulator of all listed and prospective listed companies. This
minimizes the risk that such self-regulation may impair competition, as the SFC has the
statutory duty to supervise, monitor, and regulate the HKEx under this two-tier regula-
tory relationship.129 The regulatory complexity, however, cannot be simplified by signing
memoranda of understanding between regulatory agencies. Although the relationship be-
tween the SFC and HKEx is two-tiered, the regulatory system for the financial markets is
a three-tier system. The Chief Executive may give directions to the SFC in performance
of its regulatory functions, 130 and the Financial Secretary may require the SFC to furnish
specified information.131 The Executive Government has directly involved itself in regu-
lating the financial markets. The appointment of the Chairman of the HKEx has to be
approved by the Chief Executive, who also has the power to remove the Chairman from
office. 132 The Financial Secretary may appoint no more than eight members to the board
of directors of the HKEx.133 Historically, the Executive Government has appointed a
majority of the HKEx board membership.134 As the HKEx is a listed company, its regula-
tory role over listed companies is a direct conflict of interest. The intervention over the
governance by the Executive Government creates another conflict of interest, in that it
has a vested interest in defending its appointees.
123. Id. § 68(1).
124. Id.; see SECURITIES & FTIURES COMMITTEE. & THE STOCK ExCH. OF H.K. LTD., MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING GOVFRNING LISTING MATFERS, at 1, 17, (Mar. 6, 2000).
125. See Companies Ordinance, supra note 92.
126. Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571AE, § 3. (H.K.),
127. Securities and Futures Ordinance, supra note 34, at § 5(1)(b).
128. SECURITIES & FUTURES COMMISSION & THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG, LTD., MEMO-
RANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BET"WEEN SECURITIES & FUTURES COMMISSION & HONG KONG Ex-
CHANGES & CLEARING LIrFED ON MATTERS RELATING TO: SFC OVERSIGHT, SUPERVISION OF
EXCHANGE PARTICIPANTS, MARKET SURVEILLANCE (Feb. 20, 2001).
129. Securities and Futures Ordinance, supra note 34, at § 5(1)(b).
130. Id. § 11(1).
131. Id. § 12.
132. Id. § 69.
133. Id. § 77(1).
134. HONG KONG FINANCIAL SECRETARY, REPORT BY THE EXPERT GROUP TO REVIEW THE OPERATION
OF THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES REGULATORY STRUCTURE 12 (Jan. 13, 2003).
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According to a report of the International Monetary Fund, the three-tiered regulatory
system in Hong Kong results in a lack of clarity of regulatory roles and a perception of
weak enforcement.1 35 It criticizes the retention of the front-line regulatory function for
listed firms by the HKEx as an inherent conflict of interest. It recommends prompt action
to address this mischief136
V. Conclusion
The enactment of the Securities and Futures Ordinance marked the beginning of a
comprehensive set of provisions harmonizing a series of overlapping ordinances in the
securities area. Like any piece of legislation, it is the substance, i.e., the enforcement
mechanism, rather than the form, which counts. The root of the problems in regulating
the financial markets rests with the conflicting roles in cnforcing the regulations rather
than the financial legislation. The minibond crisis is a natural consequence of the ethos of
the Hong Kong financial markets. The issues of fairness have to be seriously addressed,
particularly the gaming nature of the financial market, the unscrupulous practice of the
market players without due regard to minimal ethical standards, and the lack of a level
playing field.
The regulatory objectives of any piece of legislation are efficiency, equity, and simplic-
ity. The demutualization of the stock exchanges in Hong Kong has cut down the adminis-
trative, compliance, regulatory, and transaction costs. Although a single, large financial
market is not necessarily effective in the absence of competition, theoretically it is at least
as efficient in allocating capital funds because it should be able to provide a sufficient
source of information for decision makers in making their financial decisions. Similarly,
the three-tiered regulatory system in Hong Kong has to be revamped along this line. The
economies of scale necessitated the integration of the regulatory agencies, e.g., HKMA
and SFC, in order to lower transaction costs and to avoid duplication of regulatory func-
tions, resulting in increased efficiency. The recommendation of the Expert Group to cre-
ate a single financial market and corporate regulator under the SFC is crucial to the
successful operation of the regulatory framework.137
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